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INTRODUCTION 
Rape in Indian Country has recently become the subject of 
partisan campaign fodder and systemic racism in Washington, D.C.1 It 
is time to set the record straight on the Violence Against Women Act 
(“VAWA”) reauthorization.2 
                                                                                                       
* Ryan Dreveskracht is an Associate at Galanda Broadman PLLC, of Seattle, an 
American Indian majority-owned law firm. His practice focuses on representing 
businesses and tribal governments in public affairs, energy, gaming, taxation, and 
general economic development. He holds an LL.M. in Sustainable International 
Development from the University of Washington and a J.D. from the University of 
Arizona. He can be reached at 206.909.3842 or ryan@galandabroadman.com. 
 1. See, e.g. Adding Injury to Injury: Judiciary Committee’s Decision on HR 4970 
is a Black Eye to Women, PONTE AL DIA, May 11, 2012,  
http://www.pontealdia.com/primer-plano/adding-injury-to-injury.html; Laura Bassett, 
John Conyers: GOP’s Violence Against Women Act Is A “Flat-Out Attack On 
Women,” HUFFINGTON POST (May 8, 2012),  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/08/rep-john-conyers-violence-against-
women-act-vawa_n_1499822.html; Irin Carmon, The Coming Fight Over Violence 
Against Women, SALON (Mar. 20, 2012), 
http://www.salon.com/2012/03/20/the_coming_fight_over_violence_against_women/; 
Jonathan Weisman, Women Figure Anew in Senate’s Latest Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
15, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/us/politics/violence-
against-women-act-divides-senate.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 2. The VAWA was first passed as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
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BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
Over the years, the U.S. Supreme Court has used numerous 
excuses to divest tribal governments of their inherent power3 to assert 
jurisdiction over non-Indians who enter Indian lands: “intrusion[s] on 
personal liberties” if non-Indians are subject to tribal jurisdiction;4 non-
Indians have no say in tribal political decisions;5 tribes are not bound 
by the U.S. Constitution;6 tribal law is “unfamiliar” to non-Indians and 
                                                                                                       
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified 
primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Violence Against Women and 
Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 
2960 (2006), extended authorization for various VAWA spending provisions through 
fiscal year 2011. This article discusses legislation to reauthorize VAWA spending 
provisions through fiscal year 2016. 
 3. That tribal governments held, at one point, the implicit sovereign “power[] of 
autonomous states” to assert both criminal and civil jurisdiction over citizens who 
purposefully availed themselves of tribal lands, persons, or resources has never 
seriously been questioned by the Court. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 
191, 208 (1978). Rather, the question has been whether and to what extent that power 
has been “implicitly divested,” U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978), by a tribe’s 
“inconsistent . . . status [as a] conquered and dependent” sovereign. Oliphant, 435 U.S. 
at 196 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974)); see also generally 
Samuel E. Ennis, Implicit Divestiture and the Supreme Court’s (Re)Construction of the 
Indian Cannons, 35 VT. L. REV. 623 (2011); but see infra notes 110-18 and 
accompanying text. 
 4. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990). 
 5. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 
408, 445 (1989). This argument is somewhat ironic, considering that it is tribal nations 
that “have been subjected to the domestic legislation and policies of the United States 
without being formally included in the policymaking process.” Angelique 
EagleWoman, Bringing Balance to Mid-North America: Restructuring the Sovereign 
Relationships Between Tribal Nations and the United States, 41 BALT. L. REV. 671, 
689 (2012). 
 6. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 383-84 (2001) (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 
U.S. 376, 384 (1896)). Still, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”) requires that 
tribal courts provide all rights afforded to defendants in state and federal court, save 
appointed counsel for indigent criminal defendants. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 
1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (2010). Persons convicted by tribal courts may seek a 
federal habeas review, per 25 U.S.C. § 1303, to determine whether these rights were 
properly afforded. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 49 (1978); Trans-
Canada Enterprises, Ltd. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 634 F.2d 474, 477 (9th Cir. 
1980); see also Quintin Cushner & Jon M. Sands, Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010: 
A Primer, With Reservations, 34 CHAMPION 38, 41 (2010) (discussing the habeas 
corpus practice in Indian Country); Letter from Kevin Washburn et al., Law 
Professors, to Senator Patrick Leahy et al., Chairmen and Ranking Members of the 
Senate Judiciary Comm. (Apr. 21, 2012), at 5-6, 
http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/vawa-letter-from-law-professors-tribal-
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will therefore be “unusually difficult for an outsider to sort out.”7 The 
list of such pretexts seems to grow with each inevitable8 sovereignty-
eroding decision.9 This, despite that numerous studies have found the 
guarantees and traditions of fairness in tribal statutory, common, and 
tribal law are equivalent to and, indeed, sometimes even go far 
beyond,10 those granted in state and federal forums.11 In short, the 
                                                                                                       
provisions.pdf (noting that the proposed VAWA’s tribal protections “re-emphasize[] 
and reinforce[] the protections afforded under ICRA”). 
 7. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384-85. 
 8. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Resisting Federal Courts on Tribal Jurisdiction, 81 
U. COLO. L. REV. 973 (2010); Ennis, supra note 3; see also David H. Getches, 
Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in 
Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573 (1996). 
 9. See Bethany Berger, Testing U.S. Supreme Court Assumptions Regarding 
Tribal Courts, 1 (2005) (unpublished paper), http://www.ncaiprc.org/files/Testing 
%20U.S.%20Supreme%20Court%20Assumptions%20Regarding%20Tribal%20Courts
.pdf; see also Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court as They Affect the Powers and 
Authorities of the Indian Tribal Governments: Hearing on Concerns of Recent 
Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Future of Indian Tribal Governments in 
America Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 10. See Elizabeth Ann Kronk, American Indian Tribal Courts as Models for 
Incorporating Customary Law, 3 J. COURT INNOVATION 231 (2010) (discussing the 
advantage of a tribal forum from a civil and human rights perspective); see also 
Richard B. Collins, Indian Courts in the Southwest, 63 A.B.A. J. 808, 811 (1977) (“If 
the choice were mine, I would choose Indian tribal courts over existing rural state 
alternatives as more suitable, more economical, and more just . . . .”); see generally 
Korey Wahwassuck, John P. Smith, & John R. Hawkinson, Building a Legacy of 
Hope: Perspectives on Joint Tribal-State Jurisdiction, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 859, 
882 (2010). 
 11. See generally Wenona T. Singel, Indian Tribes and Human Rights 
Accountability, SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (on file with author); Matthew 
L.M. Fletcher, Indian Courts and Fundamental Fairness: Indian Courts and the Future 
Revisited (Mich. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Research Paper No. 10-15, 2012); Mark D. 
Rosen, Evaluating Tribal Courts’ Interpretations of the Indian Civil Rights Act, in THE 
INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY 275 (Kristen A. Carpenter et al. eds., 2012); Leah 
Catherine Shearer, Justice in Indian Country: A Case Study of the Tulalip Tribes 
(2011) (unpublished M.A. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles), 
available at http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/justice-in-indian-country-a-
casestudy-of-the-tulalip-tribes1.pdf; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Courts, the Indian 
Civil Rights Act, and Customary Law: Preliminary Data (Mich. State Univ. Coll. of 
Law, Research Paper No. 06-05, 2008) available at 
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1103474; Benjamin J. Cordiano, 
Note, Unspoken Assumptions: Examining Tribal Jurisdiction over Nonmembers Nearly 
Two Decades After Duro v. Reina, 41 CONN. L. REV. 265 (2008); Patrick M. Garry et 
al., Tribal Incorporation of First Amendment Norms: A Case Study of the Indian Tribes 
of South Dakota, 53 S.D. L. REV. 335 (2008); Troy A. Eid, Beyond Oliphant: 
Strengthening Criminal Justice in Indian Country, 54 FED. LAW. 40 (2007); Berger, 
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excuses relied upon by the Supreme Court were—and are—empirically 
baseless. 
The tribal jurisdiction-stripping trend arguably12 began in 1978 
when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
                                                                                                       
supra note 9; Joseph P. Kalt & Joseph William Singer, Myths and Realities of Tribal 
Sovereignty: The Law and Economics of Indian Self-Rule (Harvard Univ., John F. 
Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 
RWP04-016, Mar. 2004), available at 
 http://web.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=1884; 
NAT’L ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, MEANINGFUL INVOLVEMENT AND 
FAIR TREATMENT BY TRIBAL ENVTL. REGULATORY PROGRAMS: A REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL (2004); Carole E. Goldberg, 
Individual Rights and Tribal Revitalization, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 889 (2003); Mark D. 
Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Of 
Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 479 (2000); Nell 
Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal 
Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285 (1998); Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, 
Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts, 46 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 287 (1998); Christian M. Freitag, Note, Putting Martinez to the Test: Tribal 
Court Disposition of Due Process, 72 IND. L.J. 831 (1997); Frank Pommersheim & 
Shermann Marshall, Tribal Court Jurisprudence: A Snapshot From the Field, 21 VT. 
L. REV. 7 (1996); Douglas B.L. Endreson, The Challenges Facing Tribal Courts 
Today, 79 JUDICATURE 142, 146 (1995); Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, 
and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 411 
(1992); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT: A REPORT OF 
THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS (1991); Elmer R. Rusco, Civil 
Liberties Guarantees Under Tribal Law: A survey of Civil Rights Provisions in Tribal 
Constitutions, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 269 (1989); Richard B. Collins, Indian Courts in 
the Southwest, 63 A.B.A. J. 808 (1977); see also Letter from Troy A. Eid & Thomas B. 
Heffelfinger, Former U.S. Attorneys, to U.S. House Representatives (Apr. 30, 2012), 
available at http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/vawa-4-30-12-support-ltr.pdf 
(noting that “as a practical reality, the last thing Indian tribes want to do is to 
encourage federal court review that eviscerates” tribal jurisdiction, and that “tribes are 
working diligently to ‘get it right’ in the event of federal judicial review by protecting 
non-Indian defendants’ federal constitutional rights” and ensuring “that judges, 
prosecutors and public defenders have the same quality of training and credentials as 
their state and federal counterparts. . ..”). But see Patience Drake Roggensack, Plains 
Commerce Bank’s Potential Collision With the Expansion of Tribal Court Jurisdiction 
by Senate Bill 3320, 38 U. BALT. L. REV. 29, 38-39 (2008) (making unfounded 
criticisms of tribal courts). 
 12. Congress asserted jurisdiction over “major” Indian-on-Indian crimes in 1885, a 
response to the Supreme Court’s decision of Ex Parte Crow Dog holding that criminal 
jurisdiction over these crimes was exclusive to tribes. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 
556 (1883). Arguably, the Crow Dog case was purposefully set up as a means to incite 
Congress to impose greater federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands. See 
generally Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey 
Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503 (1976). 
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Tribe13 that non-Indians are not subject to the criminal jurisdiction of 
Indian tribes.14 Aside from the political and economic upset that this 
intrusion into tribal sovereignty has caused, 15  the more important 
practical consequence of Oliphant was the creation of a jurisdictional 
gap that allowed non-Indian criminals to enter Indian reservations and 
literally get away with murder16 or, more commonly, rape.17 Neither the 
                                                                                                       
 13. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 14. Id. Oliphant relied purely on unsupported legal conclusions to bolster its 
“implicit divestiture” theory. See Press Release, Matthew L.M. Fletcher et al., 
Statement of the Michigan State University College of Law Indigenous Law and 
Policy Center on the Tribal Law and Order Act, at 3 (Nov. 10, 2011); Geoffrey C. 
Heisey, Comment, Oliphant and Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians: 
Asserting Congress’s Plenary Power to Restore Territorial Jurisdiction, 73 IND. L.J. 
1051, 1062-70 (1998); Peter C. Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole is 
Greater than the Sum of the Parts, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 391, 396 (1993); Robert A. 
Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and 
Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219, 265-74 
(1986). Some have noted that the decision was likely intended to have little practical 
effect – of the 127 reservations that exercised criminal jurisdiction in 1978, only 33 
extended jurisdiction to non-Indians. Amy Radon, Note, Tribal Jurisdiction and 
Domestic Violence: The Need for Non-Indian Accountability on the Reservation, 37 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1275, 1292 (2004). 
 15. See generally Ryan Dreveskracht, Tribal Court Jurisdiction and Native Nation 
Economies: Another Trip Down the Rabbit Hole, 67 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 65 
(2010). 
 16. See, e.g., Levi Rickert, Cold Case Pine Ridge Murders Review: A Step Toward 
Justice, NATIVE CONDITION, June 4, 2012, http://www.nativenewsnetwork.com/cold-
case-pine-ridge-murders-review-a-step-toward-justice.html; Dennis Wagner, Poor 
Justice on Arizona Indian Reservations Has Crime Running Rampant, ARIZONA 
REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 2010, 
 http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2010/09/13/20100913arizona-
indian-reservation-crime.html. 
 17. See Timothy Williams, For Native American Women, Scourge of Rape, Rare 
Justice, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2012, at A1; see also infra notes 49-83 and 
accompanying text. Misdemeanor crimes are also subject to the rule, and are scarcely 
prosecuted. Gavin Clarkson & David DeKorte, Unguarded Indians: The Complete 
Failure of the Post-Oliphant Guardian and the Dual-Edged Nature of Parens Patriae, 
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1145 (2010). The relatively small Salt River Indian 
Reservation, for example, faces more than 450 misdemeanor domestic violence 
complaints a year – one act of domestic violence every nineteen hours. National 
Congress of American Indians, Title IX of S. 1925, Fighting Domestic Violence Locally 
to Stop Violence Against Native Women, 
http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/vawa-combat-dv-locally.pdf (last visited 
July 18, 2012). In 2006 and 2007, U.S. Attorneys prosecuted an average of twenty-four 
misdemeanor crimes on Indian lands, total. Id. “As any expert on domestic violence 
knows, these kinds of crimes have a snowball effect. If the perpetrator isn’t stopped 
early on, when the crimes are mere misdemeanors, they have a troubling tendency to 
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federal government,18 nor the states,19 have filled this jurisdictional 
                                                                                                       
escalate to felonious assault and even murder.” Press Release, Fletcher et al., supra 
note 14, at 4. 
 18. In most states, non-Indian on Indian criminal jurisdiction is exclusively federal 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006). CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL 
LAW AND PROCEDURE 93 (2004); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE 
MANUAL, EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER OFFENSES BY NON-INDIANS 
AGAINST INDIANS § 9-20.685, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00685.htm.  
In light of this responsibility, both the executive and legislative branches of the federal 
government have explicitly acknowledged a trust and fiduciary obligation to protect 
tribal members from non-Indian crime. See id. (“United States Attorneys have . . . a 
very important role to play in reacting to crimes by non-Indians against Indians. It is 
their responsibility to make sure that the tribal community is protected from crimes by 
persons over whom neither the tribe nor the state has jurisdiction.”); Protection of 
Indian Arts and Crafts, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202, 124 Stat. 2258 (2010) (finding that 
“the United States has distinct legal, treaty, and trust obligations to provide for the 
public safety of Indian country”). As to enrolled members of Indian tribes, “tribal 
nations retain authority over all crimes committed by Indians, whether they are 
misdemeanors or felonies” – although this jurisdiction may be concurrent with the 
federal government and/or neighboring states. Sarah Deer, Violence Against Women 
and Tribal Law, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, July 16, 2012, available at 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/opinion/violence-against-women-and-
tribal-law-123664. While tribes can prosecute Indian defendants, they are not, 
however, allowed to impose jail sentence that is longer than one year. Constitutional 
Rights of Indians, 25 U.S.C. §1302(7) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 19. See generally STEWART WAKELING ET AL., POLICING ON AMERICAN INDIAN 
RESERVATIONS: A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (2001); Eileen M. 
Luna, Seeking Justice, Critical Perspectives of Native People: Law Enforcement 
Oversight in the American Indian Community, 4 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 149 (1999). A 
number of tribes rely on state and local authorities for police services under Pub. L. 
No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (“P.L. 280”). This law was passed as part of a larger 
effort to “terminate” Indian tribal governments and gave California, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Alaska the power to enforce the same criminal laws 
within Indian Country as they did outside of Indian Country. The surrounding, and 
generally larger, non-Indian community is supposed to pay for these local police 
services – but rarely does so to adequate levels. TRIBAL LAW AND POLICY INSTITUTE, 
FINAL REPORT: FOCUS GROUP ON PUBLIC LAW 280 AND THE SEXUAL ASSAULT OF 
NATIVE WOMEN 7 (Dec. 31, 2007); WAKELING ET AL., supra at 8. Giving states 
jurisdiction under P.L. 280 has made the problem of Indian Country crime much 
worse. See generally Valentina Dimitrova-Grajzl et al., Jurisdiction, Crime, and 
Development: The Impact of Public Law 280 in Indian Country (last updated Sept. 18, 
2012) (unpublished paper), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2093681; Carole Goldberg & 
Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First Century? Some Data at 
Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697 (2006); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC LAW 280 AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY – RESEARCH PRIORITIES (2005); Carole Goldberg & 
Heather Valdez Singleton, Research Priorities: Law Enforcement in Public Law 280 
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void.20 Indeed, sex offenders are now using Indian reservations as safe 
havens to commit sex crimes against Indian women.21 
The United States’ failure to prevent systematic violence inflicted 
upon Native American women by non-Indian men is nothing new.22 
During westward expansion by early American and British colonizers, 
sexual abuse of Native women occurred quite frequently.23 In the late 
19th century, forced relocation to reservations resulted in numerous 
accounts of sexual assault by military forces, who often demanded 
                                                                                                       
States (July 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
https:// www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/209926.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC 
LAW 280: ISSUES & CONCERNS FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME IN INDIAN COUNTRY (2004); 
Carole Goldberg, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian 
Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (1997). For decades, despite much outrage by tribal 
victims of domestic violence that states have failed to fulfill their obligations assumed 
under P.L. 280, the complaints have fallen on deaf ears. See, e.g., Jon Stark, Lummis 
Rally to Support Tougher Domestic Violence Law, BELLINGHAM HERALD, June 26, 
2012; Deborah S. Brennan, Tribes Seek More Power for Their Police Forces, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2000, at A3. 
 20. See Laura E. Pisarello, Comment, Lawless by Design: Jurisdiction, Gender and 
Justice in Indian Country, 59 EMORY L.J. 1515, 1516 (2010) (“[I]f you want to rape or 
kill somebody and get away with it, do it on an Indian reservation.”) (citing Wetzelbill, 
I Was Witness to One on My Reservation, Comment to One in Three Native American 
Women Will Be Raped in Her Lifetime, DEMOCRATICUNDERGROUND.COM (July 26, 
2007, 8:06 PM),http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard. 
php?az=view_all&address=389x1446613#1446807). 
 21. Williams, supra note 17; Brian P. McClatchey, The Tribal Law and Order Act 
of 2010: Toward Safe Tribal Communities, 54 ADVOCATE 24, 25 (Aug. 2011). This 
problem is not limited solely to domestic violence crimes. Some pedophiles, for 
example, have found employment as teachers in Bureau of Indian Affairs’ schools 
even after being caught molesting children in other jurisdictions. Gavin Clarkson, 
Justice Declined: Criminals Prey on the Unprotected, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Aug. 
29, 2007, at A3. Reports indicate that by exploiting the jurisdictional gap, these 
pedophiles continued to rape and exploit children with no fear of prosecution. Id. 
 22. See Andrea L. Johnson, Note, A Perfect Storm: The U.S. Anti-Trafficking 
Regime’s Failure to Stop the Sex Trafficking of American Indian Women and Girls, 43 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 617, 631-32 (2012) (“European colonizers used Native 
women for their own sexual fulfillment . . . . Native women captured in the wars 
between colonizers and tribes were frequently used for sex and labor or sold for 
profit.”). 
 23. Id. at 632. Indeed, rape of Native women was not even prohibited under the 
U.S. legal regime until, arguably, the late nineteenth century. Id. (citing Andrea Smith, 
Not an Indian Tradition: The Sexual Colonization of Native Peoples, 18 HYPATIA 70, 
73 (2003)); BRAD ASHER, BEYOND THE RESERVATION: INDIANS, SETTLERS, AND THE 
LAW IN WASHINGTON TERRITORY, 1853-1889, at 3-10 (1999); Virginia H. Murray, A 
Comparative Survey of the Historic Civil, Common, and American Indian Tribal Law 
Responses to Domestic Violence, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 433, 441-43 (1998). 
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sexual favors for food, clothing, and shelter.24 The urban relocation 
programs of the 1940s and 1950s25 left Indian women stranded in urban 
areas where they were unemployed at eight to ten times the national 
average—a situation that experts describe as “the perfect opportunity” 
for sexual assault by non-Indians.26 Forced sterilization27 and child 
removal policies28 of the 1960s and 1970s further “ensured that yet 
another generation of Native women would be exposed to sexual 
abuse.”29 
That we have known for some time how to put an end to this 
epidemic makes it that much worse. For instance, a 2001 U.S. 
Department of Justice study on reservation policing found the 
following: 
Beginning in the 1970s, a handful of Indian nations embarked on 
successful paths of social and economic development.30 Research 
by the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic 
Development31 indicates that the common denominator among 
                                                                                                       
 24. Sarah Deer, Relocation Revisited, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 621, 653, 661-62 
(2010); see also EagleWoman, supra note 5, at 674 (“[T]he United States employed 
military force . . . to consolidate political and social power. . . . Without [traditional] 
food sources, tribal peoples became instantly dependent on the U.S. rations provided as 
part of the payments for the millions of acres ceded in treaties and agreements.”). 
 25. Under these programs, federal employees traveled to reservations in order to 
“recruit[] young Native people to move to the city, where they were promised that jobs 
and housing were plentiful.” Id. at 670. 
 26. Id. at 670-71. 
 27. See MATTHEW CONNELLY, FATAL MISCONCEPTION: THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL 
WORLD POPULATION 271 (2008) (discussing the forced sterilization policies of the 
federal government vis-à-vis Indian women). 
 28. Patrice H. Kunesh, Transcending Frontiers: Indian Child Welfare in the United 
States, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 17, 22 (1996). Under this policy, “Indian children 
were taken from their families on the reservations and sent, often across the country, to 
attend boarding schools.” Id. It was the goal of the federal government to place Indian 
children “in a totally foreign and controlled environment where they would throw off 
all vestiges of Indian identity and put on the habits of ‘civilized’ people.” Id. 
 29. Deer, supra note 24, at 665. 
 30. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher & Peter S. Vicaire, Indian Wars: Old and 
New, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 201, 203-11 (2012); Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal 
Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 777 (2006); Kevin K. 
Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779 
(2006). 
 31. See generally HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT, THE STATE OF NATIVE NATIONS (2008); Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. 
Kalt, Two Approaches to the Development of Native Nations: One Works, the Other 
Doesn’t, in REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND 
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these successful tribes was an effective government – one that was 
capable of both determining and implementing the policy 
priorities of the community. One indicator of a tribal 
government’s ability to make and implement effective decisions is 
whether or not it has increased control over its own institutions. . . 
. An important lesson from this research is the effect of increased 
tribal control over tribal institutions. Only those tribes that have 
acquired meaningful control over their governing institutions have 
experienced improvements in local economic and social 
conditions. The research has not found a single case of sustained 
economic development where the tribe is not in the driver’s seat. . 
. . The general point is that self-determined institutions, ones that 
reflect American Indian nations’ sovereignty, are more effective.32 
When it comes to crimes committed against Native women, 
however, Congress has taken a backwards approach: an “increase[d] 
federalization of tribal law enforcement.”33 Congress knew as early as 
the 1980s that this approach had failed in every instance, and had no 
reason to believe that it would work to prevent the disturbingly high 
rates of domestic violence and sex crimes in Indian Country that 
existed even at that time.34 It is clearly not working today.35 As noted in 
                                                                                                       
DEVELOPMENT 3 (Miriam Jorgensen ed., 2007); Kalt & Singer, supra note 11; Miriam 
Jorgensen, Bringing the Background Forward: Evidence From Indian Country on the 
Social and Cultural Determinates of Economic Development (2000) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author); Economic Development 
Hearing Before the Comm. on Indian Affairs, 104th Cong. 8 (1996) (testimony of 
Joseph P. Kalt, Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development). 
 32. WAKELING ET AL., supra note 19, at viii. 
 33. McClatchey, supra note 21, at 25 (emphasis added); see also WAKELING ET AL., 
supra note 19, at 54 n.2 (“It is impossible to be truly sovereign without exercising real 
self-determination in policing.”). 
 34. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Amendments of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2285, 2296 (1988) (“[C]ompared to state, county and 
municipal governments of similar demographic and geographic characteristics, the 
level of development attained by [t]ribal governments over the past twelve years in 
remarkable. This progress is directly attributable to the success of the federal policy of 
Indian self-determination.”); McClatchey, supra note 21, at 25 (noting that 
“[r]eservations have long been places where criminals can . . . get away with drug 
trafficking, domestic violence, rape, [and] assault” and that these crimes have been 
“beyond the reach of tribal courts and often not worthy of the scarce resources of the 
U.S. Attorneys.”). 
 35. See infra notes 49-83 and accompanying text; Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, 
Tangled up in Knots: How Continued Federal Jurisdiction Over Sexual Predators on 
Indian Reservations Hobbles Effective Law Enforcement to the Detriment of Indian 
Women, 41 N.M. L. REV. 239, 243 (2011) (“[W]hile crime outside Indian reservations 
10 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3 
a recent Columbia Human Rights Law Review article: 
This jurisdictional paradox disables those who are best positioned 
to effectively intervene: the tribes . . . whose prosecutors and 
investigators are more invested in and aware of the challenges in 
their local tribal communities. Embedded within Native 
communities and Native culture and priorities, tribal courts are 
considered by many to be the most appropriate forum for 
adjudicating cases arising on reservations, particularly culturally 
sensitive cases involving sexual exploitation.36 
These conclusions reverberate throughout every study analyzing 
the Indian rape epidemic. 37  The most recent U.S. Government 
Accountability Office study on the topic, for instance, found that: 
                                                                                                       
has generally declined in recent years, reservations have seen violent crime spiral 
upward over the same time period. For sexual assaults, the number of reported cases is 
staggering.”). 
 36. Johnson, supra note 22, at 689. 
 37. See Clarkson & DeKorte, supra note 17, at 1138-39 (noting that federal 
agencies have “little incentive to be responsive to the urgency or emotional impact of a 
crime and . . . often have little accountability to the tribal community itself”); Painter-
Thorne, supra note 35, at 284 (noting that “authorizing tribal governments to prosecute 
reservation crime regardless of the offence or perpetrator” is the “most obvious 
solution”); McClatchey, supra note 21, at 25 (noting that “the ultimate solution to this 
problem” is to “authorize tribal justice systems to prosecute any offenders within the 
reservation boundaries and fully fund tribal justice systems”); Matthew Handler, Tribal 
Law and Disorder, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 261, 286-87 (2010) (finding that federal 
prosecutors are not well-positioned to prosecute crimes on tribal reservations because 
they are not aware of community priorities and values); Paul Schmelzer, Bachmann 
Votes Against Act to Help Native American Police Combat Rape “Epidemic,” MINN. 
INDEPENDENT (July 28, 2010), http://minnesotaindependent.com/61865/bachmann-
votes-against-bill-to-help-native-american-police-combat-rape-epidemic (noting that 
reservation crime is a local issue best resolved by local authorities); MINN. INDIAN 
WOMEN’S RES. CTR., SHATTERED HEARTS 112 (2009) [hereinafter SHATTERED HEARTS] 
(finding that “[a]ny approach to addressing the problem must prioritize the healing and 
empowerment of Native communities, and ensure that they are not re-victimized” as a 
result of efforts to address the problem); Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous 
Jurisprudence of Rape, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 121, 126 (2004) (“[S]tate and 
federal government[s] cannot address the unique spiritual and emotional issues that 
arise in the context of a sexual assault. A woman’s ability to seek justice in her own 
community may facilitate healing and emotional wellness.”); see generally U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, BUILDING TRUST BETWEEN THE POLICE AND THE CITIZENS THEY SERVE 
(2010); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT 
INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 30 (2007) [hereinafter 
MAZE OF INJUSTICE]; THOMAS PEACOCK ET AL., COMMUNITY-BASED ANALYSIS OF THE 
U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM’S INTERVENTION IN DOMESTIC ABUSE CASES INVOLVING 
INDIGENOUS WOMEN (1999). 
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“tribal justice systems are often the most appropriate institutions for 
maintaining law and order in Indian country.”38 Experience teaches the 
same. According to former U.S. Attorneys Troy A. Eid and Thomas B. 
Heffelfinger: 
[L]ocal public safety institutions – those that are closer and more 
accountable to heir communities – are the best positioned to 
protect their citizens and promote equal justice for all. . . . Given 
the alarmingly high rates of domestic violence and abuse in much 
of Indian Country, it is senseless – if not unconscionable – to 
deprive Native American communities of the basic legal tools 
needed to protect their most vulnerable citizens. Tribal 
governments need and deserve the right to prevent, prosecute and 
punish crimes on their lands . . . .39 
This year, Congress finally addressed—or at least began to 
address—the issue.40 On April 26, 2012, the U.S. Senate passed S. 
1925,41 a version of VAWA that attempted to close the Oliphant gap by 
reauthorizing42 tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
who rape and otherwise violate Indian women. The proposed tribal 
amendments specifically incorporate the known solution to the 
epidemic by “respecting the power of local governments to be more 
                                                                                                       
 38. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-658R, TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER 
ACT: NONE OF THE SURVEYED TRIBES REPORTED EXERCISING THE NEW SENTENCING 
AUTHORITY, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COULD CLARIFY TRIBAL ELIGIBILITY 
FOR CERTAIN GRANT FUNDS (2012). 
 39. Letter from Troy A. Eid & Thomas B. Heffelfinger to U.S. House 
Representatives, supra note 11. 
 40. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2011, S. 1925, 112th Cong. 
(2012). Congress was indisputably aware of the causes, at least under the current legal 
scheme, for the prevalence of violence against Native women since October of 2009: 
[C]auses for the prevalence of violence against Native women [include]: (1) 
a lack of resources for police to investigate these crimes and resources to 
collect evidence, (2) a lack of police training for investigations and evidence 
collection, and (3) a lack of urgency at the federal level in investigating and 
prosecuting crimes of domestic and sexual violence. 
S. REP. NO. 111-93, at 19 (2009). Congress was also aware of the solution. See id. at 16 
(“When federal officials decline to prosecute alleged reservation crimes, tribal courts 
often provide the last opportunity for justice for the victim and the tribal community.”). 
 41. S. 1925, supra note 40. 
 42. From the explicit terms of S. 1925, tribal criminal jurisdiction was not derived 
from the federal government and delegated to tribes, but, rather, was “recognized and 
affirmed” as the “inherent power . . . to exercise special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction over all persons.” Id. § 204(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
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accountable to the communities they serve.”43 Importantly, this return 
of jurisdiction to tribal governments is a very limited first step: under 
S. 1925 tribal governments would only be allowed to assert criminal 
jurisdiction when the victim is an enrolled member of an Indian tribe 
and the defendant resides in Indian Country or has some “sufficient 
ties” with a prosecuting tribe.44 
In May, however, the Republican-controlled House passed its 
version of the VAWA, H.R. 4970,45 which omitted the Senate’s tribal 
provisions. Curiously, during the House Judiciary Committee markup 
of the Bill, Committee Chairman Lamar Smith (R-TX) refused to allow 
consideration of a substitute amendment offered by Ranking Member 
John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI) that would reinsert the tribal provisions.46 
Representative Darrell Issa (R-CA) attempted to offer a similar 
amendment, which was also disregarded by the Judiciary Committee 
Chairman.47 
In an apparent acknowledgement that the Supreme Court’s 
previous excuses are largely unsubstantiated, all of the aforementioned 
pretexts were virtually absent from the House Report accompanying 
H.R. 4970 (“House Report”).48 Unfortunately, in their place was an 
even more insulting and bigoted expression of subterfuge. 
WHAT’S THE BIG DEAL? IT ISN’T THAT BAD. 
That there exists a rape and violent crime epidemic in Indian 
                                                                                                       
 43. Letter from Troy A. Eid & Thomas B. Heffelfinger to U.S. House 
Representatives, supra note 11. 
 44. S. 1925, supra note 40, § 204(d)(3); The text of the Senate bill reads, in relevant 
part: 
In a criminal proceeding in which a participating tribe exercises special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, the case shall be dismissed if: (A) 
the defendant files a pretrial motion to dismiss on the grounds that the 
defendant and the alleged victim lack sufficient ties to the Indian tribe; and 
(B) the prosecuting tribe fails to prove that the defendant or an alleged 
victim: (i) resides in the Indian country of the participating tribe; (ii) is 
employed in the Indian country of the participating tribe; or (iii) is a spouse 
or intimate partner of a member of the participating tribe. 
Id.; see also Letter from Kevin Washburn et al. to Patrick Leahy, supra note 6, at 4-5 
(noting that “[t]he scope of the restored jurisdiction [in the VAWA] is quite narrow” 
and discussing the scope of VAWA tribal jurisdiction). 
 45. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2012, H.R. 4970, 112th Cong. 
(2012). 
 46. H.R. REP. NO. 112-480, at 227 (2012). 
 47. Id. at 246. 
 48. See generally id. 
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Country is well established. Consider these statistics: 
• Native American women suffer violent crime at the highest 
rates in the United States.49 
• Thirty-four percent of Native women will be raped in their 
lifetimes.50 
• Thirty-nine percent will suffer domestic violence.51 
• On many reservations, Native women are murdered at a rate 
more than ten times the national average.52 
• Violent crime rates in Indian country are more than 2.5 times 
the national rate.53 Some reservations face more than twenty 
times the national rate of violence.54 
• Forty-six percent of all Native women have experienced rape, 
physical violence, and/or stalking at some point in their life.55 
• The rate of violent victimization among Native women is 
more than double that among all women.56 
• When Native women are victimized, they are victimized 
much more violently than non-Indians, with fifty-six percent 
of their injuries requiring medical attention, compared to 
thirty-eight percent for whites.57 
                                                                                                       
 49. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162 § 901, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006); Press Release, Lynn 
Rosenthal & Kimberly Teehee, The White House, Strengthening the Violence Against 
Women Act (Apr. 25, 2012), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/04/25/strengthening-violence-against-women-
act. 
 50. S. REP. NO. 111-93, at 2 (2009); PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE: FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 22 (2000); MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 37, at 2. 
 51. S. REP. NO. 111-93, at 19; Michele C. Black & Matthew J. Breiding, Adverse 
Health Conditions and Health Risk Behaviors Associated with Intimate Partner 
Violence, 57 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP, 113, 115 (2008). 
 52. Obama Wants to Increase DV Sanctions to Protect Indian DV Victims on Tribal 
Lands, 17 NAT. BULL. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTECTION, art. 9, Nov. 2011. 
 53. STEVEN W. PERRY, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME: A BJS STATISTICAL 
PROFILE, 1992-2002 iv (2004) (report of the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of 
Justice Statistics). 
 54. Id. 
 55. CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 3 (2011). 
 56. PERRY, supra note 53, at v. 
 57. RONET BACHMAN ET AL., VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA 
NATIVE WOMEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE: WHAT IS KNOWN 49 (2008) 
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• American Indians experience approximately one violent 
crime for every ten residents age twelve or older, compared to 
one violent crime for every twenty-five whites.58 
• Native women rank at the bottom of nearly every social, 
health, and economic indicator.59 
• In some rural Alaskan villages, the rate of sexual violence 
against Native women is twelve times higher than the 
national rate.60 
• In South Dakota, Indians make up ten percent of the 
population, but account for forty percent of the victims of 
sexual assault.61 
• Alaska Natives make up fifteen percent of the state’s 
population, but account for sixty-one percent of the victims of 
sexual assault.62 
• Non-Indians commit over eighty percent of the rapes and 
sexual assaults against Indian women.63 
Although the FBI is responsible for investigating rape and sexual 
assault crimes across the country, approximately one-in-four of those 
prosecuted occur on Indian reservations.64 
On some of the most crime-ridden reservations, as few as three 
federal officers are responsible for patrolling millions of acres of 
land.65 These officers are typically located a substantial distance from 
tribal communities and are generally unaware of the exigency of many 
of the reported incidents of rape and violence.66 It is not uncommon for 
Native victims of sexual assault to “have to wait hours or days to 
                                                                                                       
 58. Id. at 5. 
 59. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A QUIET CRISIS: FEDERAL FUNDING AND UNMET 
NEEDS IN INDIAN COUNTRY, at ix (2003). 
 60. Williams, supra note 17. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. PERRY, supra note 53, at 9; PEACOCK ET AL., supra note 37, at 339 n.55; 
BACHMAN ET AL., supra note 57, at 38; Sarah Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul: Exploring 
the Intersection of Rape Law Reform and Federal Indian Law, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
455, 457 (2005); see also Johnson, supra note 22, at 637 (Sex traffickers of Indian 
women are primarily non-Indian.). 
 64. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Journey Through Indian Country Part I, FBI 
STORIES (June 1, 2012), 
 http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2012/june/indian-country_060112. 
 65. Johnson, supra note 22, at 676. 
 66. Id. 
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receive a response from police and, in many situations, [victims] 
receive no response at all.”67 On some reservations—such as those on 
the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, which is covered by a U.S. 
Attorney’s Office over eleven hours away—sexual assaults are literally 
impossible to prosecute, given the short timeframes for properly using 
a “rape kit”68 (less than eleven hours).69 On the off-chance that a 
victim’s call is answered, local federal facilities often lack the 
necessary rape kit or specialized training to collect evidence.70 In 
addition, forty-four percent of these federal facilities lack personnel 
trained to provide emergency services to respond to sexual violence, 
and thirty percent lack the basic protocols for treating victims.71 
Prosecution is also a problem. “Because federal prosecutors have 
to prove (or disprove) whether the crime occurred within Indian 
Country, whether the suspect is Indian or non-Indian, and whether the 
victim is Indian or non-Indian, in addition to definitional requirements, 
many crimes are not prosecuted due to lack of sufficient evidence.”72 
                                                                                                       
 67. MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 37, at 43; see also Deer, supra note 24, at 680 
(“Tribal law enforcement responses . . . are often too little, too late.”). According to the 
FBI, these difficulties arise from their inability to navigate in Indian country: 
On many reservations there are few paved roads or marked streets. Agents 
might be called to a crime scene in the middle of the night 120 miles away 
and given these directions: “Go 10 miles off the main road, turn right at the 
pile of tires, and go up the hill.” In some areas, crime scenes are so remote 
that cell phones and police radios don’t work. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, supra note 62. 
 68. “A ‘rape kit’ is the name of the product frequently employed for the 
examination of a sexual assault victim in which pubic hair, blood samples, swabs, and 
specimens from various parts of the victim’s body and clothing are collected and 
retained for further forensic examination and evaluation.” United States v. Boyles, 57 
F.3d 535, 538 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 69. Press Release, Fletcher et al., supra note 14, at 3; see also, e.g., id. (“The Turtle 
Mountain Band Reservation in northwest North Dakota is more than ten hours from 
Fargo, where the U.S. Attorney’s Office is located. The U.S. Attorney’s Office in 
Cheyenne, Wyoming is as far from the Wind River Reservation as you can get in the 
state.”). 
 70. S. REP. NO. 111-93, at 20. 
 71. Id. (citing MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 37, at 41-59). In order to alleviate 
some of the evidentiary problems associated with the lack of federal prosecutions, 
various sections of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 
instruct that that federal law enforcement consult, cooperate, and coordinate with tribal 
law enforcement. Federal agents have, however, largely ignored this mandate. See, e.g. 
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief, Mandamus, and Bivens 
Damages, Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. Holder, No. 11-
3028 (E.D. Wa. Mar. 8, 2011), ECF No. 1. 
 72. Press Release, Fletcher et al., supra note 14, at 4. 
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Thus, charges are rarely filed against the perpetrators of Indian 
violence.73 According to one former federal agent, federal prosecutors 
will “only take the [cases] with a confession.”74 Federal policing agents 
are “forced to triage [their] cases”—leaving officers feeling as though 
they are “standing in the middle of the river trying to hold back a 
flood.”75 In the Navajo Nation, for example, 329 rape cases were 
reported in 2007––”five years later, there have been only 17 arrests.”76 
Other studies have found a federal prosecutorial culture that views 
Indian reservation crimes as “unimportant” and “unworthy of federal 
resources.”77 Indeed, the Department of Justice’s policies bolster this 
                                                                                                       
 73. Johnson, supra note 22, at 687 (“[F]ederal prosecutors decline 50% of cases 
from Indian country – even more when sexual abuse is involved.”); S. REP. NO. 111-
93, at 20 (“76.5% of adult rapes against Indian women, and 72% of sex crimes against 
Indian children were declined for prosecution between 2004 and 2007.”); N. Bruce 
Duthu, Broken Justice in Indian Country, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2008, at A17 (“The 
Department of Justice’s own records show that in 2006, prosecutors filed only 606 
criminal cases in all of Indian Country Indian Country . . . [which includes] more than 
560 federally recognized tribes.”); see generally Timothy Williams, Higher Crimes, 
Fewer Charges on Indian Land, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2012, at A14, available at, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/us/on-indian-reservations-higher-crime-and-
fewer-prosecutions.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-11-167R, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DECLINATIONS OF INDIAN COUNTRY 
CRIMINAL MATTERS (2010). Prejudice likely plays a large part in the declamation rate. 
See Johnson, supra note 22, at 690-91 (noting that Indian women are further 
“victimized by the prejudice of federal and state prosecutors and even jurors, who are 
often quick to stereotype victims as ‘drunken Indians’ . . ., leaving Native women and 
girls vulnerable to increasing numbers of sex [offenders] seeking to exploit this 
lawlessness.”); see, e.g. Examining the Prevalence of and Solutions to Stopping 
Violence Against Indian Women: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 
110th Cong., at 63 (2007) (statement of Karen Artichoker, Director, Sacred Circle 
National Resource Center to End Violence Against Native Women) (“[A] young 
woman came to me, she had been raped in her own home, in her own bed. And she had 
reported it, she said the criminal investigator told her, sounds to me like you need to 
change your lifestyle.”). 
 74. S. REP. NO. 111-93, at 20 (citing Laura Sullivan, Rape Cases on Indian Lands 
Go Uninvestigated, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (July 25, 2007), transcript available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=12203114). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Williams, supra note 17. 
 77. BONNIE MATHEWS, U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, INDIAN TRIBES: A 
CONTINUING QUEST FOR SURVIVAL 154 (1981); see also Painter-Thorne, supra note 35, 
at 269 (“[P]rosecution of reservation crime is dismissed as serving too small of a 
population and taking scarce federal resources away from more pressing national 
priorities such as terrorism and immigration.”); see also Pisarello, supra note 20, at 
1525; Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of 
Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court’s Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 
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sentiment: Prosecution of Indian Country crime is not part of the 
criteria used to evaluate federal officials.78 Instead, cases involving 
terrorism, organized crime, large drug busts, and white-collar crimes 
are used to measure performance. 79  Federal attorneys consider 
prosecution of Indian Country sexual assault cases to be “career 
killers.”80 Nationwide, arrests are made in only thirteen percent of 
sexual assaults reported by Native women.81 
Commonly, of the few suspects that are arrested, months will 
pass before any efforts are made to apprehend them.82 This gives plenty 
of time for retaliatory violence to be inflicted upon the victim.83 
Because a large majority of these perpetrators are non-Indian84––
thereby limiting, per Oliphant, any chance that local tribal police are 
able prosecute the offender—over eighty percent of these sexual 
offenders will go free if not prosecuted by the federal government.85 
                                                                                                       
1, 39 (1993). 
 78. Painter-Thorne, supra note 35, at 269. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 269-70; see also id. at 268 (“[F]ederal judges echo these feelings, with 
some complaining that they would have ‘stayed in state court’ if they had wanted to 
handle such cases.”). 
 81. Williams, supra note 17. 
 82. See, e.g. MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 37, at 48 (“[O]n the Standing Rock 
Sioux Reservation there are on average 600-700 outstanding tribal court warrants for 
arrest of individuals charged with criminal offences.”). 
 83. Williams, supra note 17; Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 
91 VA. L. REV. 747, 769 (2005); Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive 
Prosecution Policies: Prioritizing Victims’ Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of 
Domestic Violence Cases, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 465, 476 (2003); 
Laura Dugan, et al., Exposure Reduction or Retaliation? The Effects of Domestic 
Violence Resources on Intimate-Partner Homicide, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 169, 179 
(2003); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND TREATMENT GUIDELINES 
ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 6 (1992). 
 84. See supra text accompanying note 61. 
 85. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 676-77 (“As a result of this complex 
jurisdictional algorithm, the first question police will usually ask when approached by 
a Native victim . . . is ‘[w]as it in our jurisdiction?’ If this question is not quickly 
resolved, reported crimes often go unaddressed by tribal, state, and federal 
authorities.”) (quoting MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 37, at 8). 
With non-Indians constituting more than 76 percent of the overall population 
living on reservations and other Indian lands, interracial dating and marriage 
are common, and many of the abusers of Native American women are non-
Indian men. Too often, non-Indian men who batter their Indian wives and 
girlfriends go unpunished because tribes cannot prosecute non-Indians, even 
if the offender lives on the reservation and is married to a tribal member, and 
because Federal law enforcement resources are hours away from reservations 
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However, House Republicans apparently believe, or want the 
American electorate to believe, that the plethora of data evidencing 
widespread rape and murder of Native women is sheer statistical 
fabrication. According to the House Report, proponents of the tribal 
provisions are merely “tout[ing] unverifiable statistics about the rate of 
non-Indian violence against Indian women on Indian land, claiming 
that eighty-eight percent of the perpetrators of violence against Indians 
are non-Indians,” in order to pass some other, hidden agenda.86  House 
Republicans would rather rely solely on a “2008 study by the South 
Dakota Attorney General (‘SDAG’)”87 concluding that a mere “69 
percent of . . . Indian rape or sexual assault [cases] were, in fact, intra-
racial.” 88  In short, according to House Republicans, inter-racial 
incidence of rape isn’t that bad. 
What the House Report did not note is that the SDAG study was 
limited to the State of South Dakota and used only police prosecution 
records. This police data, of course, did not include the numerous 
instances in which on-reservation perpetrators went free due to the very 
                                                                                                       
and stretched thin.  
Rosenthal & Teehee, supra note 49; see also NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN COURT 
JUDGES ASSOCIATION, INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE 84 (Orville N. Olney & David 
H. Getches eds., 1978) (noting that there is no safety net of criminal prosecution 
authority if the federal government declines to prosecute a case). 
 86. H.R. REP. NO. 112-480, at 59 (Ironically, the sole study relied upon for the 
House Report 480’s later conclusion that the VAWA provisions are “unconstitutional” 
also contradicts this number.); see also Scott Seaborne, Crime Data Misrepresented to 
Serve Hidden Tribal Agenda, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, June 14, 2012, 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/mobile/opinion/crime-data-
misrepresented-to-serve-hidden-tribal-agenda-118360. See JANE M. SMITH & RICHARD 
M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42488, TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
OVER NON-INDIANS IN THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT (VAWA) 
REAUTHORIZATION AND THE SAVE NATIVE WOMEN ACT 1 (2012) (stating that “most” 
violence against Native women “involves an offender of a different race”) (citing 
National Congress of American Indians, Fact Sheet: Violence Against Women in 
Indian Country, http://www.mhifc.org/Articles/Violence%20Against%20Native%20 
American%20Women%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (last visited July 20, 2012) (“A 
significant characteristic of violence against Native women is the identity of the 
offender: about 9 out of 10 rape or sexual assault victims estimated the offender was 
someone of a different race. Among American Indian victims of violence, 75% of the 
intimate victimization . . . involved an offender of a different race.”). 
 87. Larry Long et al., Understanding Contextual Differences in American Indian 
Criminal Justice, 32 AMER. INDIAN CULTURE & RESEARCH J. 4 (2008), available at 
http://www.standupca.org/reports/Long%20article%20on%20DOJ%20Statistics%20S
ATPR1P4510011215380.pdf. 
 88. H.R. REP. NO. 112-480, at 59-60. 
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jurisdictional gap indicated above (which, by its nature, excludes non-
Indians), where police had refused to investigate the crimes,89 or where 
the crimes went unreported.90 The House Report’s reading of this study 
has been contradicted by numerous independent reports, including 
recent studies conducted by the Department of Justice91 and Amnesty 
International.92 Indeed, as noted by the National Congress of American 
Indians: 
Upon analysis, [the SDAG study] supports [the] concern that 
domestic violence crimes committed by non-Indians are often 
unprosecuted. The DOJ statistics measure reported assaults. [The 
SDAG study] compares that to prosecutions, and concludes that 
most of the defendants in South Dakota are Indians. That is [the] 
point – non-Indians commit many assaults on Indians, and they 
are not prosecuted. This is particularly true in South Dakota.93 
                                                                                                       
 89. Obama Wants to Increase DV Sanctions to Protect Indian DV Victims on Tribal 
Lands, supra note 52 (“A memorandum uncovered during a mass firing of U.S. 
Attorneys scandal during the Bush Administration revealed that some were fired, in 
part, for giving too much attention to Indian Crimes.”). 
 90. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 636 (“[M]any Native victims do not report such 
crimes, believing no one will investigate.”); id. at 671 (“Native victims’ relationship 
with law enforcement is comparable to that of foreign victims trafficked from unstable, 
impoverished nations without rule of law.”); Pisarello, supra note 20, at 1530 (citing 
Law Enforcement in Indian Country, Hearing Before the Committee on Indian Affairs, 
110th Cong. 22 (2007) (“Many Indian women do not report sexual assaults because 
such cases are rarely prosecuted.”); SHATTERED HEARTS, supra note 37, at 5 (“Native 
victims of sexual assault often do not report the assault because they do not believe that 
authorities will investigate or charge the crime, and they fear being blamed or criticized 
by people in their communities.”);  CARYN E. NEUMANN ,  SEXUAL CRIME :  A REFERENCE 
HANDBOOK 51-52 (2009) (reporting findings that “Native American women did not 
report rape because of their suspicion of law enforcement” and because they “may not 
get a police response for hours or days”); MENDING THE SACRED HOOP & THE 
PROGRAM TO AID VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, SAFETY & ACCOUNTABILITY AUDIT OF 
THE RESPONSE TO NATIVE WOMEN WHO REPORT SEXUAL ASSAULT IN DULUTH 
MINNESOTA 68 (2008) (finding that “race plays a negative part” in how Native 
American women are treated by  law enforcement and that victims who do  report 
crimes have “such  bad experiences that, if they [a]re subsequently raped again, they 
d[o] not report it.”);  Barbara Perry, From Ethnocide to Ethnoviolence: Layers of Native 
American Victimization, 5 CONTEMP. JUSTICE REV. 231, 243 (2002) (“[T]he feelings of 
powerlessness experienced by so many American Indians . . . tend to drain them of the 
will or capacity to confront the dominant white society in the face of violence done to 
them.”).  
 91. PERRY, supra note 53. 
 92. MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 37. 
 93. Letter from Jacqueline Johnson Pata, Exec. Dir., National Congress of 
American Indians, to Lamar Smith, Chairman, & John Conyers, Ranking Member, 
20 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3 
What is more important, who cares if it is eighty-eight percent or 
thirty-one percent of sexual predators who are allowed to violate 
Native women and get away scot-free? The fact that House 
Republicans take the position that Indian rape and violence is tolerable 
up to some point between those two numbers is absolutely deplorable.94 
Were this the case in any other part of the country, affecting any other 
racial demographic, such atrocities would surely not be tolerated. 
Attempting to depict some legitimate support for their position, 
House Republicans stated in the House Report that it is the Department 
of the Interior’s “opinion that non-native domestic violence offenders 
represent a very small percentage of domestic violence-reported crimes 
in Indian Country.” 95 Shortly after the House Report was issued, 
however, the Interior released a letter to the Chairman of the House 
Judiciary Committee “in order to set the record straight on statements” 
in the House Report.96 The Interior stated that the House Report made 
the reference “[w]ithout any citation or footnote”—because the 
statement was “not true.”97 The letter went on: “To the contrary, the 
[Bureau of Indian Affairs] recognizes that over half of all Indian 
married women have non-Indian husbands and that Indian women 
experience some of the highest domestic-violence victimization rates in 
the country.”98 The Interior then chided the House Republicans for 
                                                                                                       
Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives (May 3, 2012), available at 
http://democrats.judiciary.house.gov/sites/democrats.judiciary.house.gov/files/docume
nts/NCAI120503.pdf 
 94. See Sharon Stapel, House VAWA Bill is Racist, Elitist, Homophobic, and Anti-
Victim, RH REALITY CHECK (May 15, 2012, 11:12 AM), 
 http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/print/19652 (noting that H.R. 4970 “would not just roll 
back protections for all survivors of violence in this country but . . . would specifically 
and explicitly say to some victims: we will not protect you. We do not care about you. 
You are not worth it.”); but see Caroline P. Mayhew, VAWA Tribal Provisions and 
Race Discrimination Arguments, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (May 29, 2012), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/opinion/vawa-tribal-provisions-and-race-
discrimination-arguments-114790 (noting that H.R. 4970 discriminates against tribal 
sovereignty, not the Native American race, necessarily). While Mayhew’s point is well 
taken, writ large, the House Report 480’s discussion of rape and domestic violence 
statistics – statistics that are race-based – misses this point altogether. 
 95. H.R. REP. NO. 112-480, at 60. 
 96. Letter from Michael R. Smith, Acting Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs to 
Lamar Smith, Chairman, House Judiciary Committee (May 17, 2012), available at 
http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/bia-clarification-on-house-vawa-
report.pdf. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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“los[ing] sight of the simple fact that there is no acceptable rate of 
domestic violence by non-Indian men on Indian women.”99 For House 
Republicans “[t]o argue otherwise,” the Interior stated, “is an assault 
on our national conscience.”100 
CONSTITUTIONALITY AND SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
The other explanation offered by the House Report is that 
because tribal governments “are not subject to the government 
limitations enumerated in the Constitution[,] 101  it is an unsettled 
question of constitutional law whether Congress has the authority . . . 
to recognize inherent tribal sovereignty over non-Indians.”102 This is a 
blatant misstatement of federal law. 
In Duro v. Reina,103 the Supreme Court held that in addition to 
being unable to assert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians per 
Oliphant, tribal governments also could not assert criminal jurisdiction 
over an Indian defendant that is not a member of the tribe attempting to 
assert such jurisdiction.104 As a result of Duro, because non-member 
Indians are still Indians, a vast abyss was created where nobody had 
jurisdiction to try non-member Indians for misdemeanors committed 
on tribal lands. In response, Congress quickly enacted the so-called 
“Duro Fix” by affirming “the inherent power of Indian tribes . . . to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”105 In United States v. 
Lara,106 a defendant contested the constitutionality of the Duro Fix by 
arguing that the Constitution dictated the metes and bounds of tribal 
autonomy to end at its own members. 107  Finding this argument 
unpersuasive, the Court explicitly held that “Congress does possess the 
                                                                                                       
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (“[T]he powers of local self 
government enjoyed by [tribal governments] existed prior to the Constitution, they are 
not operated upon by the Fifth Amendment, which . . . had for its sole object to control 
. . . the National Government.”); EagleWoman, supra note 5, at 678 (“Tribal Nations 
are extra-constitutional, meaning there is no role for tribal governments in the U.S. 
Constitution, and furthermore, the Tribes have never consented to participate in the 
U.S. Constitutional structure.”). 
 102. H.R. REP. NO. 112-480, at 58. 
 103. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
 104. Id. at 677-78. 
 105. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006). 
 106. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
 107. Id. at 205. 
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constitutional power to lift the restrictions on the tribes’ criminal 
jurisdiction.”108 The Supreme Court asserted that while Oliphant and 
Duro do reflect the Court’s view of tribal sovereign status, those 
decisions in no way imply “constitutional limits prohibiting Congress 
from taking actions to modify or adjust that status.”109 Rather, the 
Supreme Court held that Congress possesses the power to “relax 
restrictions that the political branches have, over time, placed on the 
exercise of a tribe’s inherent legal authority.” 110  The decision is 
especially important to the VAWA tribal provisions because of the 
Court’s acknowledgement that its own determination of what aspects 
of sovereignty have been “implicitly” divested “are not determinative” 
regarding tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction. Congress is the final 
authority on the status of tribes, and can give back what has been 
implicitly divested when it sees fit.111 The question is settled, and has 
been for some time. 
House Republicans purportedly relied upon a report by the 
Congressional Research Service (“CRS Report”) to support their 
“unconstitutionality” argument. 112  Although the CRS Report was 
somewhat disingenuous,113 it did not—as the House Report credits it as 
doing—conclude that the VAWA tribal provisions presented “an 
unsettled question of constitutional law.” Rather, the report stated that 
“[a]lthough the Supreme Court stated in Lara that Congress has 
authority to relax restrictions on the tribes’ inherent authority so that 
they may try non-member Indians, it is not clear that today’s Court 
would reach the same result.” 114  Essentially speculating that the 
Roberts Court of 2012 would rule differently than the Rehnquist Court 
of 2004 had ruled in Lara, the CRS Report went on to surmise that “it 
is not clear that the Court considering a tribal court conviction under 
                                                                                                       
 108. Id. at 200 (emphasis added). 
 109. Id. at 194. 
 110. Id. at 196. 
 111. Id. at 207. 
 112. JANE M. SMITH & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42488, 
TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER NON-INDIANS IN THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
ACT (VAWA) REAUTHORIZATION AND THE SAVE NATIVE WOMEN ACT 1 (2012). 
 113. Harold Monteau, Congressional Research Service Shows Bias With VAWA 
Legal Opinion, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, June 13, 2012, 
 http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/opinion/congressional-research-service-
shows-bias-with-vawa-legal-opinion-118086. 
 114. JANE M. SMITH & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42488, 
TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER NON-INDIANS IN THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
ACT (VAWA) REAUTHORIZATION AND THE SAVE NATIVE WOMEN ACT 6 (2012). 
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the [VAWA tribal provisions] would find that Congress has the 
authority to expand inherent sovereignty of tribes to try non-Indian 
defendants.”115 Of course, to do so today the Roberts Court would need 
to overturn Lara. 
This is not to say that there is no legitimate question of Supreme 
Court ideology presented by the VAWA tribal provisions.116 Although 
the Lara Court made quite clear that Congress has the power to lift 
restrictions on tribes’ inherent criminal jurisdiction, the scope of that 
inherent criminal jurisdiction has yet to be explicitly determined as to 
non-Indians, at least by the Supreme Court.117 In Oliphant, the Court 
seemed to signal that inherent criminal jurisdiction did include the 
power to prosecute non-Indians, and called on Congress to reauthorize 
the assertion of tribal sovereignty in this area: 
We recognize that some Indian tribal court systems have become 
increasingly sophisticated and resemble in many respects their 
state counterparts. We also acknowledge that with the passage of 
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, which extends certain basic 
procedural rights to anyone tried in Indian tribal court, many of 
the dangers that might have accompanied the exercise by tribal 
courts of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians only a few 
decades ago have disappeared. Finally, we are not unaware of the 
prevalence of non-Indian crime on today’s reservations, which the 
tribes forcefully argue requires the ability to try non-Indians. But 
these are considerations for Congress to weigh in deciding 
whether Indian tribes should finally be authorized to try non-
Indians.118 
In Lara, the Court appeared to indicate the same: 
                                                                                                       
 115. Id. at 7. 
 116. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Legislating in Light of the Ideology and Politics of 
the Super-Legislature (On Obamacare and an Oliphant Fix), TURTLE TALK (June 25, 
2012, 9:15 AM), http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2012/06/25/legislating-in-light-of-the-
politics-of-the-super-legislature-on-obamacare-and-an-oliphant-fix/ (noting that “[t]he 
Court changes Indian law all the time. Ideology matters here, more than politics” and 
that “during the VAWA Reauthorization . . . debates, Dems assumed the 
constitutionality of a partial Oliphant fix. Under current law, it’s obviously 
constitutional. But the Supreme Court can change things.”). 
 117. Cf. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323-24 (holding that “the sovereign 
power to punish tribal offenders has never been given up . . . and that tribal exercise of 
that power today is therefore the continued exercise of retained tribal sovereignty.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 118. Oliphant v. Squamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211-12 (1978). 
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[T]he Court in [Oliphant and Duro] based its descriptions of 
inherent tribal authority upon the sources as they existed at the 
time the Court issued its decisions. Congressional legislation 
constituted one such important source. And that source was 
subject to change. Indeed Duro itself anticipated change by 
inviting interested parties to “address the problem [to] Congress.” 
495 U.S., at 698. We concede that Duro, like several other cases, 
referred only to the need to obtain a congressional statute that 
“delegated” power to the tribes. But in so stating, Duro (like the 
other cases) simply did not consider whether a statute, like the 
present one, could constitutionally achieve the same end by 
removing restrictions on the tribes’ inherent authority. 
Consequently we do not read any of these cases as holding that the 
Constitution forbids Congress to change “judicially made” federal 
Indian law through this kind of legislation.119 
The Court has, however, in the past (at least arguably) determined 
that some aspects of on-reservation criminal and civil jurisdiction are 
not inherent. In Rice v. Rehner, the Supreme Court seemed to find that 
the regulation of liquor was never an aspect of “tribal self-
government.”120 Rather, according to the Court, this power was vested 
solely in the federal government from the time that liquor was 
introduced to Indian Country.121 
Indeed, in his concurrence in Lara, Justice Kennedy indicated his 
mistaken belief that the historical status of tribal sovereignty was 
                                                                                                       
 119. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 206-07 (2004) (citation omitted). 
 120. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 724 (1983). 
 121. Id. at 722-24. The Court’s conclusion was somewhat wavering. At some points 
it seems clear that tribal governments never had the inherent power to regulate alcohol: 
Unlike the authority to tax certain transactions on reservations that we have 
characterized as “a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes 
retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of their 
dependent status,” tradition simply has not recognized . . . inherent authority 
in favor of liquor regulation by Indians. . . . With respect to the regulation of 
liquor transactions, as opposed to . . . state income taxation . . . , Indians 
cannot be said to “possess the usual accouterments of tribal self-government. 
Id. (citation omitted). At other points, the Court states that the power to regulate was 
congressionally divested: “There can be no doubt that Congress has divested the 
Indians of any inherent power to regulate in this area.” Id. at 724; see also id. at 723 
(noting a “congressional divestment of tribal self-government in this area”). Of course, 
liquor is quite different from crime – criminal regulation of nonmembers was nothing 
“new.” Although, neither was alcohol. See ANDREW BARR, DRINK: A SOCIAL HISTORY 
OF AMERICA 1 (2000) (noting that “[i]t is not true (as is often supposed) that [tribes] 
had no alcoholic drinks”). 
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similarly limited vis-à-vis non-Indian criminal jurisdiction when he 
stated that this jurisdiction would “subject American citizens to the 
authority of an extraconstitutional sovereign to which they had not 
previously been subject.”122 Tribal governments never had the power to 
prosecute non-Indian criminals—their inherent sovereign authority 
never extended that far; so, the argument would go.123 Indeed, in what 
could be perceived as a preemptive strike—or a very clever placement 
of indoctrination—the House Report again misled in its statement that 
“[i]f signed into law, this would be the first time that Indian Tribal 
governments have civil and criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. . 
.”124 
Of course, this is absolutely false. Tribal courts currently have 
limited civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, exercised in a number of 
contexts, usually related to business transactions between Indians and 
non-Indian.125 As to criminal jurisdiction, prior to the Supreme Court’s 
decision of Oliphant in 1978, tribal governments exercised full 
authority to prosecute non-Indians who entered into Indian Country 
and committed crimes. 126  Indeed, four years before Oliphant, the 
                                                                                                       
 122. Lara, 541 U.S. at 213 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 123. The counter argument was made in Justice Stevens’ concurrence, where he 
argued that if Congress can allow the states – entities that rely entirely on the federal 
government’s recognition – this inherent power over non-citizens, then it must do the 
same for tribes. See id. at 210-11 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 124. H.R. REP. NO. 112-480, at 58. 
 125. Tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians extends (1) “where non-Indians ‘enter 
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members’”; or (2) “where the conduct of a 
non-Indian ‘threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.’” Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, 
Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 806 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Montana v. United 
States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)); see, e.g., Dish Network Serv. v. Laducer, No. 12-
0058, 2012 WL 2782585 (D.N.D. July 9, 2012). 
 126. Clarkson & DeKorte, supra note 17, at 1139; Marie Quasius, Note, Native 
American Rape Victims: Desperately Seeking an Oliphant-Fix, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1902, 
1930 (2009); MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, ADDRESSING THE EPIDEMIC OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE IN INDIAN COUNTRY BY RESTORING TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 3 (2009);  EILEEN 
LUNA-FIREBAUGH ,  TRIBAL POLICING :  ASSERTING SOVEREIGNTY, SEEKING JUSTICE 31 
(2007); Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Promoting Tribal Self-Determination in a Post-Oliphant 
World: An Alternative Road Map, 54 FED. LAW. 41, 41 (2007); Goldberg & 
Champagne, supra note 19, at 700; COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
§1.02[3] (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005); Radon, supra note 14, at 1292; Gavin 
Clarkson, Reclaiming Jurisprudential Sovereignty: A Tribal Judiciary Analysis, 50 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 473, 482 (2002); G.D. Crawford, Looking Again at Tribal Jurisdiction: 
“Unwarranted Intrusions on Their Personal Liberty,” 76 MARQ. L. REV. 401, 420 
(1993); Nell Jessup Newton, Comment, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. 
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Solicitor General issued a lengthy opinion concluding “Indian tribes 
originally had the power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians.”127 Logic, in other words, prevailed: “[j]ust as residents of one 
state can be held to account for breaking the laws of another state they 
voluntarily enter, someone who enter[ed] an Indian reservation [would] 
be held to account for the violence he commit[ted] there.” 128 
Specifically, as to violence against women before Oliphant, tribes were 
very “able and willing to deal with perpetrators of violence against 
women” and the “ability to enforce their laws bred a culture where 
women were safe.”129 For the Supreme Court to make a factual finding 
otherwise would be a vast departure from reality. 
Unfortunately—as Indian Country is acutely aware per 
Oliphant, 130  similar cases,131  and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in 
                                                                                                       
Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 109, 124 (1992). 
 127. ALEX TALLCHIEF SKIBINE & MELANIE BETH OLIVIERO, LAW ENFORCEMENT ON 
INDIAN RESERVATION AFTER Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe: AN IDENTIFICATION 
OF THE PROBLEMS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REMEDIES 7 (1980) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
 128. Painter-Thorne, supra note 35, at 292. Some have argued that because non-
Indians who bought on Indian reservations pursuant to the General Allotment Act, 25 
U.S.C. 331, et seq. (1887), must have thought that the reservations and tribal 
governments would soon disappear, in accordance with congressional intent, and 
therefore did not conceive of the possibility that tribal jurisdiction over them would 
remain. See, e.g., Seaborne, supra note 84. Because these expectations were justified, 
so the argument goes, the modern-day court should protect these on-reservation 
landowners by generally denying tribal jurisdiction over all non-members found on 
Indian reservations. Id. As reasonable is it may seem, this revisionist argument is 
factually inaccurate and, more importantly, legally unsound. See generally Ann E. 
Tweedy, Unjustifiable Expectations: Laying to Rest the Ghosts of Allotment-Era 
Settlers, 36 SEATTLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2005413. 
 129. Amanda M.K. Pacheco, Broken Traditions: Overcoming the Jurisdictional 
Maze to Protect Native Women From Sexual Violence, 11 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 1, 
3 (2009). 
 130. See Fletcher, et al., supra note 14, at 2 (noting that Oliphant was “crafted out of 
150 years of self-serving legislative history for bills never enacted by Congress, 
Interior Solicitor’s opinions later withdrawn, and U.S. Attorney General opinions 
defending the rights of slaveowners to murder their slaves”) (citing ROBERT A. 
WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND 
THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 97-113 (2005)). 
 131. See, e.g. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289-90 (1955) 
(“Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent were 
deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the Indians ceded 
millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food, and trinkets, it was not a sale 
but the conquerors’ will that deprived them of their land.”); cf. Joseph William Singer, 
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Lara 132 —the Supreme Court is no stranger to rewriting history, 
particularly when it involves tribal sovereignty. But this should not 
deter our elected officials in the Beltway. As noted by professors at the 
Indigenous Law and Policy Center at the Michigan State University 
College of Law, “any solution to Indian country crime that places 
Indian tribes in the front-line—where they properly should be—
requires a clear and cogent response to these concerns, regardless of 
whether the Supreme Court would strike down an Act of Congress 
providing for such a solution.”133 
CONCLUSION 
The federal government has a distinct legal responsibility to 
ensure that the rights, well-being, and safety of Indian women are 
maintained.134 For much of the history of federal-tribal relations, the 
United States has failed miserably in fulfilling this obligation. 135 
Despite an abundance of evidence identifying exactly where the 
solution to the rape epidemic in Indian Country lies, Congress has yet 
to take action.136 Again, were this the situation in any other part of the 
                                                                                                       
Well Settled? The Increasing Weight of History in American Indian Land Claims, 28 
GA. L. REV. 481, 526 (1994) (noting that when Justice Reed in Tee-Hit-Ton rewrote 
“history to suit his purposes.”). 
 132. 541 U.S. at 213 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 133. Press Release, Fletcher et al., supra note 14, at 11. 
 134. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202(a)(1) (“[T]he 
United States has distinct legal, treaty, and trust obligations to provide for the public 
safety of Indian Country.”); see also 155 Cong. Rec. S. 4333 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2009); 
STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE FEDERAL-TRIBAL TRUST RELATIONSHIP: ITS ORIGIN, NATURE, 
AND SCOPE 3 (2008); sources cited infra note 16. 
 135. See MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 37, at 42 (noting that “federal and state 
governments provide significantly fewer resources for policing in Indian Country . . . 
than are provided to comparable non-Native communities” and citing DOJ statistics 
that show that tribes have fifty-five percent to seventy-five percent of the policing 
resources available to comparable rural communities). Some have suggested that “a 
return to an international framework” may force the federal government to “assist in 
healing the . . . social injuries inflicted upon Tribal Nations.” EagleWoman, supra note 
5, at 672; see also Gabriel S. Galanda, American Indian Treaties: The Consultation 
Mandate, U.N. Doc. HR/GENEVA//SEM/EXPERT/2012/BP.2 (July 17, 2012) 
(providing a roadmap on how to enforce international law domestically). Indeed, the 
U.S.’ failure to take corrective action to cure this epidemic undoubtedly violates 
numerous international laws. See Brief for Indian Law Resource Center & Sacred 
Circle National Resource Center to End Violence Against Native Women as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Plaintiff, Gonzales v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R. (Nov. 13, 2008), at 29-40. 
 136. See Clarkson & DeKorte, supra note 17, at 1166 (“[I]f anything, non-Indian 
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United States, affecting any other racial group, Congress would simply 
not allow such atrocity to continue. As it stands today, the blood is on 
House Republicans’ hands. 
According to the White House, the President will veto any 
VAWA reauthorization bill that does not include protections for Indian 
Country domestic violence victims. 137  Washington Senator Patty 
Murray (D-WA) has also vowed to reject any agreement with the 
House that does not include the tribal provisions,138 as has fellow 
Washington Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA). 139  Ranking House 
                                                                                                       
against Indian crime has increased over the past thirty years, while Congress has not 
assumed the responsibility that the Court laid at its feet.”). 
 137. Press Release, Exec. Office of the President, Statement of Administration 
Policy: H.R. 4970 – Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2012 (May 15, 
2012). The statement reads, in relevant part: 
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critical provisions that are part of the Senate-passed VAWA reauthorization 
bill. For instance, H.R. 4970 fails to provide for concurrent special domestic 
violence criminal jurisdiction by tribal authorities over non-Indians, and 
omits clarification of tribal courts’ full civil jurisdiction regarding certain 
protection orders over non-Indians. Given that three out of five Native 
American women experience domestic violence in their lifetime, these 
omissions in H.R. 4970 are unacceptable. 
Id.; see also Press Release, Jodi Gillette, Senior Policy Advisor for Native American 
Affairs, White House Domestic Policy Council, Celebrating the Two-Year 
Anniversary of the Tribal Law and Order Act (Aug. 1, 2012) (“[T]he tribal provisions 
in the bipartisan version of VAWA passed by the Senate would provide tribes with the 
authority to hold offenders accountable for their crimes against Native American 
women, regardless of the perpetrator’s race.  Congress should approve the bipartisan 
version of VAWA passed by the Senate.”) 
 138. Russell Berman, Sen. Murray Balks at Compromise with House on Violence 
Against Women Act, THE HILL (June 26, 2012, 11:12 PM), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/234787-sen-murray-balks-at-compromise-with-
house-on-violence-against-women-act. 
 139. Weisman, supra note 1. At the same time, Washington State Republican 
gubernatorial hopeful Rob McKenna advocates for mere “tribal civil authority” over 
non-Indian rapists, stopping short of recommending the jurisdictional power that is 
needed to bring criminal justice – and safety – to Indian Country. Rob McKenna, 
Wash. State Attorney Gen., Address at the Twenty-Third Annual Centennial Accord 
(June 7, 2012). While Attorney General McKenna is at least addressing the issue with 
some thought, which is much more than can be said of his fellow GOPers, fines and 
civil restraining orders are not adequate responses to reservation murder and rape. Id. 
McKenna’s gubernatorial opponent, Congressman Jay Inslee (D-WA), on the other 
hand, actually introduced the Stand Against Violence and Empower Native Women 
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Democrats Edward Markey (D-MA) and Dan Boren (D-OK) are 
putting further pressure on the House by requesting hearings to address 
the “accountability for violent crimes in Indian country” that they fear 
is “decreasing as Native women continue to be victims of sexual 
assault at alarming rates.”140 Former U.S. Attorneys Troy A. Eid and 
Thomas B. Heffelfinger—both Republican Presidential appointees—
have also been “prompt[ed] to speak out on the need for the [VAWA] 
amendments.” 141  The American Bar Association has passed a 
Resolution “urg[ing] Congress to strengthen tribal jurisdiction to 
address crimes of gender-based violence committed on tribal lands in 
the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act.”142 As of 
publication hundreds of concerned tribal and women’s rights advocates 
are making their voices heard on Capitol Hill.143 
The jurisdictional gap created by our High Court nearly thirty-
five years ago has created an extremely dangerous environment for 
Native women. It is only now that a solution to the sexual assault 
epidemic in Indian Country has finally been proffered in the Senate’s 
VAWA reauthorization bill. But if the House Republicans’ willful 
ignorance and misogyny is allowed to prevail, the solution will fall 
through the political cracks. 
Meanwhile, Native women remain vulnerable to violent criminals 
who remain above the law. 
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